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Abstract The aim of this paper is to help refine the definition of humans as
“linguistic animals” in light of a comparative approach on nonhuman animals’
cognitive systems. As Uexküll & Kriszat (1934/1992) have theorized, the epistemic
access to each species-specific environment (Umwelt) is driven by different
biocognitive processes. Within this conceptual framework, I identify the salient
cognitive process that distinguishes each species typical perception of the world as
the faculty of language meant in the following operational definition: the ability to
connect different elements according to structural rules. In order to draw some
conclusions about humans’ specific faculty of language, I review different empirical
studies on nonhuman animals’ ability to recognize formal patterns of tokens. I
suggest that what differentiates human language from other animals’ cognitive
systems is the ability to categorize the units of a pattern, going beyond its perceptual
aspects. In fact, humans are the only species known to be able to combine semantic
units within a network of combinatorial logical relationships (Deacon 1997) that can
be linked to the state of affairs in the external world (Wittgenstein 1922). I assume
that this ability is the core cognitive process underlying a) the capacity to speak (or to
reason) in verbal propositions and b) the general human faculty of language
expressed, for instance, in the ability to draw visual conceptual maps or to compute
mathematical expressions. In light of these considerations, I conclude providing some
research questions that could lead to a more detailed comparative exploration of the
faculty of language.
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Introduction
Aristotle (≈ 350 b.C/2004) defined man as “zoon logikon”, an expression typically
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is an argument of intense philosophical debate. I believe that data resulting from etholog-
ical research into cognition can provide a significant contribution to this topic. Therefore,
the goal of this paper is to help refine the definition of humans as “linguistic animals” in
light of a comparative approach with nonhuman animals’ cognitive systems.
It is worth highlighting a distinction that not all spoken languages make, namely the
semantic distinction between the faculty of language, meant in a broad sense, and the actual
ability to speak and understand a natural language. The former meaning is used in reference
to various cognitive domains such as nonhuman animals’ cognitive and communication
systems, as well as to math, art, music, and so forth–while the second refers to the ability to
speak (or sign) a natural language such as English, Chinese, or Italian. This terminological
distinction is expressed, for example, by the French words langue-language.
I will focus my investigation on the sense of the word “language” meant in a broad
sense. Specifically, I will use a comparative study of the cognitive skills in nonhuman
primates and songbirds in an attempt to demonstrate how the general ability of
language could be conceived of as a domain of cognitive processes shared among
animals. Secondly, in light of this data, I will address a core human-specific cognitive
process at the basis of both the ability to speak (or to reason) in verbal propositions
and of the general faculty of language expressed, for instance, in the ability to draw
visual conceptual maps or to compose musical pieces.
Umwelt and Syntax: The Species-Typical World
It is commonly assumed that the epistemic approach to the world is reliant on the
quantity of information that each different animal species is able to perceive and
elaborate. In contrast to this idea, Uexküll & Kriszat (1934/1992) observe that there is
no such thing as a single world shared by every animal species. On the contrary, each
species has a “biocognitive” apparatus that enables it to access a distinctive, species-
typical “world-environment”: the Umwelt. This entails that in every living species the
system of cognition is strictly intertwined with the sensorial domain in such a way
that the sensorial perception of an object consists in the possibility to recognize in it
something essential for life itself (Uexküll and Kriszat 1992; see Carapezza 2006). In
other words, according to Uexküll the perception of an object is made up of the
recognition of its effect in terms of functionality for life. However, each species’
Umwelt depends precisely on the way in which each species-specific biocognitive
apparatus perceives the functions and the effects of those external objects.
This concept is efficiently clarified by Lo Piparo (1998), who compares the
biocognitive system of each species to the algorithm implementing a complicated
mathematical function that uses facts of the external environment as its set of
arguments, and mental states as its set of values generated by applying the algorithm
to the arguments. From this perspective, the algorithm used for the pair “state of
mind-environment”—i.e. the biological mechanisms underlying the functional per-
ception of the world–has a principal role in the description of animals’ cognitive
systems. Following this theoretical paradigm, I assume that the “cognitive algorithm”
shared across species consists of the ability to primarily pick up connections or
articulations among objects (through the species-specific bio-sensorial modalities),
rather than merely isolated single objects in the world.
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Accordingly, my investigation on the faculty of language (meant in its broad
sense) focuses on the ability to connect different elements according to the specific
rules allowed by the biocognitive potential of each species. In other words, my
investigation of the ability of language coincides with the study of the ability of
syntax, used here according to its etymological meaning from the Greek word
syntaxis (syn: together–taxis: connect, assemble according to rules). 1 Thus, along
this theoretical line, we could state that the cognitive possibility to access each
species’ Umwelt can be referred to as a core ability of “syntaxis”.
In light of these considerations, I believe that the analysis of exactly this ability in
humans could lead to a precise indication of the cognitive processes that make human
cognition species-specific. In particular, I assume that one of the most effective
strategies to adopt towards this aim would be: (i) to choose one hypothetical
constitutive feature specific to humans’ ability of syntaxis and (ii), to adopt a
comparative approach to nonhuman animals’ cognitive systems, in order to show if
they possess this supposedly unique human cognitive feature. I believe that this
specific methodology is the best candidate to provide us with a better grasp of the
cognitive similarities among animals and, at the same time, of the mechanisms that
underlie the perception of humans’ Umwelt.
A Special Kind of Syntaxis: Recursion
A distinctive feature of human language is the so called “ruled-governed creativity”
(Chomsky 1965): the ability to produce (and understand) an infinite range of various
expressions from a finite set of elements and rules. In a highly influential paper, Hauser,
Chomsky & Fitch (2002) hypothesize that the only uniquely human component of
language mechanism (underlying the property of “ruled-governed creativity”) is recur-
sion: the cognitive core responsible for hierarchical processing of self-embedding struc-
tures. From this perspective, the kind of syntaxis that differentiates human language from
other species’ system of communication is at least the faculty to connect recursively the
constitutive units of natural languages. Namely, the authors suggest that the ability to
produce an infinite range of ever-new expressions relies upon the syntactic property of
recursion. I will refer to this suggestion as the “recursion distinctiveness” hypothesis.
Linguists within the theoretical framework of generative grammar distinguish two
types of recursion: “tail recursion” and “center-embedded recursion”. The first one
can be mainly identified with a process of iteration, where constituents are just
sequentially added at the end (or at the beginning) of a sentence, as in the familiar
story of The House the Jack Built:
This is the house that Jack built.
This is the malt that lay in the house that Jack built.
This is the rat that ate the malt that lay in the house that Jack built.
This is the cat that worried the rat that ate the malt that lay in the house that Jack
built.
1 Hereafter I will italicize the terms “syntax” and “syntactic” when used according to this specified
etymological sense.
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As repetitions of sequences are found among several nonhuman species’ vocal
calls, this level of syntactic organization of the signal cannot account for the unique-
ness of human language. On the contrary, the center-embedded recursion - defined as
a procedure that invokes an instance of itself or of an equivalent procedure in the
middle of the computation - is a much more intricate procedure, never encountered
among nonhumans’ calls. Center-embedded recursion can be explained analyzing the
following examples (Corballis 2007; see Christiansen and Chater 1999):
(i) [The malt (that the rat ate) lay in the house that Jack built.]
(ii) {The malt [that the rat (that the cat killed) ate] lay in the house that Jack built.}
In (i), the phrase that the rat ate is embedded in the sentence The malt lay in the
house that Jack built, while in (ii), the phrase that the cat killed is embedded in the
phrase that the rat ate. More specifically, the formal structure of these sentences can
be illustrated as follows:
(i) a1 [the malt] a2 [that the rat] b2 [ate] b1 [lay in the house that Jack built.]
(ii) a1[The malt] a2 [that the rat] a3 [that the cat] b3[killed] b2 [ate] b1 [lay in the
house that Jack built.]
In the examples above, the same low indexes depict the connections between the
elements. For instance, in (i), a1 [the malt] is semantically and morpho-syntactically
linked to b1 [lay in the house that Jack built], whereas a2 [the rat] is linked in the same
way to b2 [ate]. In other words, these sentences respectively have the structure a1 a2
b2 b1 and a1 a2 a3 b3 b2 b1, where the ‘ab’ pairs with higher indexes are hierarchically
embedded within ‘ab’ pairs with lower indexes–namely, a procedure of a–b associ-
ation invokes an instance of itself in the middle of an equivalent a–b linking
procedure (Fig. 1).
In principle, the implementation of a recursive process allows the generation of
nested components of sentences within each other, without restriction. This implies
the ability to keep in memory a virtually unlimited amount of information about what
it has been heard (or seen), while other parts have to be checked first, and resumed
from where they are left off. To illustrate this last point, let’s return to one of our
examples. In (ii), one has to store in memory [the cat], [the rat], [the malt] as the first
constituents that are systematically going to be linked with the correspondent verb,
i.e. respectively [killed], [ate], [lay]; thus, while linking a3 [the cat] to b3, i.e. the verb
[killed], one has to keep in mind the just heard constituents a1 [the malt] and a2 [the
rat]; similarly, while connecting a2 [the rat] to b2 [ate], one has to resume the previous
connection between a3 and b3, and thus, finally process a1 b1 {[the malt] [that
lay…]}. Therefore, understanding center-embedded sentences like those above de-
pends on the preservation of all constituents in encoding or decoding the sentence.
All the constituents - or more specifically, all the constituents linked according to the
Fig. 1 Example of center-embedded structure, where ‘ab’ pairs with higher indexes are embedded in ‘ab’
pairs with lower indexes
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given morpho-syntactic and semantic interconnections–are necessary to grasp the full
meaning of the proposition. Importantly, since propositions are not mere concatena-
tions of nonsense tokens, but map systematically onto semantic references, a vital
indicator of the correct combination among words and phrases is determined by the
correct interpretation of the meaning. To show how the semantic interpretation is
crucial in determining the syntactic connections in center-embedded sentences, let’s
take into account once again (i): “a1[The malt] a2 [that the rat] a3 [that the cat]
b3[killed] b2 [ate] b3 [lay in the house that Jack built.]”. Clearly, the links between a3
[the cat] and b3 [killed], or between a2 [the rat] and b2 [ate the cheese] are not merely
perceptual but are determined by the possibility to connect the constitutive items
relying on the contextual interpretation of the meaning of the sentence (which can
also be driven by the implicit background knowledge that cats eat rats, or that rats
love cheese) as well as on morphological rules of patterning, e.g. matching verbs and
with nouns.
Hence, the only empirical way we have to assess whether a structure is recursively
center-embedded or not is by interpreting its conceptual-semantic value (Fitch 2010).
For this reason, testing Hauser et al.’s (2002) “recursive distinctiveness” hypothesis–
which implies the use of a comparative approach on nonhuman species’ ability to
process these type of structures–is highly challenging. A far more empirically
tractable hypothesis is the “supra-regular distinctiveness” one (Fitch and Friederici
2012), which, in contrast, concerns patterns of meaningless elements, ruled according
to mere perceptual similarities (e.g. matching sounds, colors or shapes). In other
words, this hypothesis focuses on a particular type of the faculty of syntaxis, which I
refer to as “perceptual syntax”.
I assume that the comparative investigation of the ability to process nonsense
perceptual patterns can reveal crucial information on both the biocognitive potential
of different nonhuman animals and on the evolutionary dynamics of human propo-
sitional language. The first comparative study conducted to test the “supra-regular
distinctiveness” hypothesis was conducted by Fitch and Hauser (2004). In their
research, the authors combined the artificial grammar learning paradigm with the
mathematical models used in the formal language theory. In the following paragraph,
I will describe this approach in greater detail.
Artificial Grammars for a Comparative Study of Syntax
Preliminary Notes on Artif icial Grammar
Several studies have been recently comparing the ability of humans and nonhuman
animals to process patterns with different levels of complexity. Scientists with this
aim were involved in a broad research program, the artificial grammar learning
paradigm, where an artificial (visual or auditory) mini-language is derived from a set
of formal logical rules. In particular, within this paradigm, artificial languages have
been created following a system of formal rules (grammar) enunciated by Noam
Chomsky (1956) within the generative grammar tradition, in order to distinguish
different levels of complexity in language. The linguist has distinguished four classes
of formal grammars, which can generate sets of sequences arranged in a mathematical
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hierarchy of increasing generative power. For the purposes of this chapter, it is worth
focusing on two grammars, namely the so-called “finite state” (or regular) grammars
and supra-regular “context-free” grammars (hereafter FSG and CFG). Each of these
two formal systems can be generated by a simple mathematical model conceivable as
an abstract machine (or automaton) that can be in one of a finite number of states. The
machine computing the FSG can be described in terms of the transition probabilities
from one state to another and of the triggering condition for each transition. One
example of the FSG is the pattern (AB)n, where the only rule is to write an occurrence
of B right after an occurrence of A for n times. In order to create such pattern, or to be
able to discriminate its formal correctness, all an automaton would need to know is a)
the initial input, b) the transition rule to the following state, and c) the number of
times after which it has to stop. As only a bounded amount of memory is enough for
this kind of automaton to work, this class of grammar is the less complex set of
generative rules. In terms of natural language, each state of the machine corresponds
to a word, thus the resulting sentence would be a linear sequential concatenation of
words or phrases, as in the case of tail recursion.
Notably, propositional language goes beyond the regular grammars’ level of com-
plexity, or in other words, beyond a FSG. This is particularly true, for example, for
recursive sentence structures of the example in (i), or for phrase structures with multiple
long distance dependencies such as the “if-then” linguistic constructs—where one has to
store in memory what comes after “if”, and connect it with the rest of the sentence to
form a sense. These latter linguistic structures can be processed by the supra-regular
context free grammars, since they require sophisticated parsing capabilities—first, on an
abstract level, since one has to be able to recognize so formed patterns - and second, in
terms of memory storage. An instance of a supra-regular grammar is the pattern AnBn,
where given a certain number of ‘a’s, the exact same number of ‘b’s follows. There are at
least three possible supra-regular strategies that could allow to recognize and process
this grammar (Fitch and Friederici 2012; Fig. 2): a) a “count and compare” strategy, that
is to count all the ‘a’s, store that value in the memory, and compare it to the number of
‘b’s; b) a second strategy is to match each b with the most recently seen ‘a’ (a center-
embedded structure); c) match each ‘a’ with a ‘b’ in the order they appear. This last
strategy, indeed, yields a so called “crossed” dependency and requires a computational
power that goes slightly beyond the one needed to recognize a context free grammar. In
all of these cases, as in the case of the propositional language, one has to keep inmemory
the different parts of the structure, in order to recognize the whole pattern.
The “Supra-Regular Distinctiveness” Hypothesis
Recently, several studies using an artificial language generated according to the rules
described in the formal language theory, have investigated whether nonhumans’
inability to acquire the syntax of a human language could follow from their inability
to process patterns that are more complex than the finite state grammars. Within this
research framework, the first comparative study was conducted by Fitch and Hauser
(2004). The authors compared the ability of a species of nonhuman primate (cotton-
top tamarins - Saguinus oedipus) and of a group of adult humans to distinguish a
regular grammar from a supra-regular grammar. An (AB)n structure was adopted as
an instance of a finite state grammar, and an AnBn structure as a supra-regular pattern.
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The occurrences of the class “A” consisted of syllables naturally spoken by a female
voice; the class “B”, on the other hand, consisted of syllables spoken by a male voice.
The syllables of the two classes consisted of pairs of consonants and vowels; for
instance, a pattern defined by the A4B4 grammar would be aaaabbbb; where four
instances of ‘B’ follow four instances of ‘A’. On the other hand, the (AB)4 grammar
would define the sequence (ab) (ab) (ab) (ab), where the number of “ab” pairs is
specified by the exponent. The authors investigated the ability to learn different levels
of syntactical complexity in humans and tamarins exposing both of them to the same
sets of stimuli so created (see O’Donnell et al. 2005).
This study suggests that parsing procedures at the level of a FSG complexity are
spontaneously available to both human and nonhuman primates. On the contrary,
only humans mastered the supra-regular AnBn pattern. This outcome explains why
nonhuman primates have always failed to acquire natural human languages, whose
internal structure goes far beyond the sequential ordering of units. Hence, the data of
this research suggest that the ability to process structures that are beyond the
complexity of a regular grammar is specific to humans. In this respect, two central
considerations need to be strongly stressed. First, since the strategies that could yield
a supra-regular AnBn structure—as we have seen in the previous paragraph–are
multiple, no conclusion about the “center-embedded recursion distinctiveness”
hypothesis can be drawn (see Fitch et al. 2012). Secondly, note that this study
focuses on tamarins’ ability to use a ruled pattern on a mere perceptual level (no
Fig. 2 Image modified from Fitch and Friederici 2012. Three different strategies can be instantiated to
recognize a AnBn pattern: a) count all the ‘a’s and compare this number with the number of ‘b’s; b) match
each b with the most recently seen ‘a’; (center-embedded pattern); c) match each ‘a’ with a ‘b’ in the order
they appear (cross-dependency pattern)
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meanings, nor morphological/conceptual patterns were present in the stimuli). In fact,
this “artificial grammar learning” task provides mere evidence that the ability to
process meaningless structures–shown to be present in tamarins–could have
grounded the evolution of the more sophisticated capacity to process sentences
involving combinatorial semantic values. In other words, the ability to distinguish
FSG from CFG investigated adopting nonsense grammars does not address the ability
to speak in verbal propositions directly. On the contrary, the comparative
investigation of this faculty sheds light on a sort of “cognitive skeleton” that might
have been a necessary but not sufficient condition for the evolution of human
language. For this reason, one has to be cautious in conflating the capacities to
process mere perceptual structures and to process verbal language as the same ability.
Recently, several studies have been applying Fitch and Hauser (2004)’s same
paradigm on different nonhuman species, specifically on two species of songbirds
(Bengalese finches, and zebra finches). Disregarding these latter crucial observations,
the authors of these studies have ipso facto blended the ability to process AnBn with
the faculty to recognize center-embedded grammars. Furthermore, taking the mistake
in an even more misleading direction, they have concluded from their positive results
that humans share the faculty to “recognize center-embedded grammars” with
nonhuman species. As a matter of clarity, I provide a detailed description of the
experimental designs adopted in these studies.
Gentner, Fenn, Margoliash & Nusbaum (2006) claim that European starlings
(Sturnus vulgaris) are able to acquire information about both (AB)n and AnBn
syntactic structures. Precisely, the authors trained the birds with only two strings,
namely ABAB as an instance of (AB)n and AABB as an instance of the grammar
AnBn. The starlings were trained to memorize motif patterns constituted by two different
song basic motifs termed “rattle” and “warbles”. For example, given the rattles as the
units a of the class “A”, and the warbles as bs of the class “B”, a sequence following an
(AB)n grammar would be rattle–warble–rattle–warble, and a AnBn pattern would be
rattle–rattle–warble–warble. After acquiring the distinction between the training sets,
the starlings were exposed to new sequences constructed from novel song phrases of
rattles and warbles, or familiar phrases and elements in a novel sequence. The starlings
could discriminate the novel strings. However, although the authors claim that these
birds were able to process recursive, center-embedded grammars, Van Heijningen, De
Visser, Zuidema & Ten Cate (2009) have clearly shown that in order to solve correctly
this task, there is absolutely no need of abstract knowledge of the grammar. In fact,
replying the study on zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata), they have demonstrated that
success in this task might have derived by attending to shared phonetic characteristics
between the familiar and the novel, such as the mere presence of AB vs. AA at the
beginning of the sequence, or the presence of BB vs. AB in the last part of the trial. The
same “perceptual shortcut strategy” could explain the success of another species of
songbirds, i.e. the Bengalese finch (Lonchura striata var. domestica), in discriminating
novel instances of (AB)n and AnBn after a training session (Abe andWatanabe 2011). In
conclusion, we can’t effectively conclude from these experimental studies that starlings
and Bengalese finches are able to process the same center-embedded structures that are
involved in human language. This is true for at least three reasons: a) as we have seen
above, the correct recognition of a recursive pattern requires as a necessary condition the
contextual interpretation of the meaning value of each constitutive unit of the structure.
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Notably, no semantic values were involved in the patterns adopted in the studies on
songbirds; b) it is possible to correctly process these patterns just paying attention to
short phonetic segments that are shared between the training and the test stimuli; c) even
accepting per absurdum that the birds were not using any “perceptual shortcut strategy”,
but were truly transferring abstract knowledge about the grammar from the familiariza-
tion to the novel test stimuli, it would be more parsimonious to infer that these species
can master a supra-regular grammar. Although from these studies we cannot draw any
conclusion about the level of pattern complexity that these songbirds can effectively
master, it is important to highlight that both Bengalese finches and zebra finches
spontaneously produce syntactically complex songs; despite lacking a context-free
structure, the sequences of syllables (i.e. uninterrupted notes—see Berwick et al.
2011) in their songs are not uttered in a random manner; on the contrary, syllables are
concatenated following specific rules that can be conceived as a particular kind of FSG
(Okanoya 2004). Therefore, the ability to perceive a supra-regular pattern on the one
hand, and to actively produce songs that follow the rules of a finite state grammar on the
other - can be interpreted as evolutionary traits shared by humans and songbirds,
selected in response to similar external pressures. The naturally following question then
is whether what distinguishes humans is their the ability to both produce and perceive
(or more precisely, to understand) well-formed context-free patterns.
Ultimately, I believe that the comparative investigation of the ability of syntaxein (on
both the perception and the production level) in different species could reveal crucial
information on the evolutionary primitives of the faculty to process verbal language. In
fact, further empirical and theoretical research is needed in order to solve the following
issue: how did the ability to elaborate structures on a perceptual domain evolve into the
ability to understand propositional syntax? In order to answer this question, it is
necessary to pinpoint in further detail the core properties of the syntactic structures
determining human language’s specificity. This will be the object of next paragraph,
where I will illustrate an important aspect of the nature of human language that in my
opinion needs to be integrated in the research paradigm so far described.
Symbolic Syntaxis
In order to answer the last question in the previous paragraph, it’s necessary to return for
a moment to the methodological strategy described at the beginning of this chapter: to
realize a comparative study on the faculty of language (in its broad sense), one should (i)
choose one hypothetical constitutive feature specific to humans’ ability of syntaxis and
(ii) adopt a comparative approach to nonhuman animals’ cognitive systems to show if
they have it. As to (i), the exploration of the “supra-regular distinctiveness” hypothesis
should be pushed forward in order to pinpoint in detail how the ability to process
combinatorial patterns in humans differs from that in nonhuman animals.
I assume that what makes humans’ syntaxis ability specific is the intrinsic possi-
bility that the interdependencies between the elements of the linguistic structure have
an external referential value; in other words, human language cannot be conceived of
as a collection of isolated tokens, with each referring to a specific external meaning.
An important clarification of this concept is made in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-
philosophicus (1922), where the author explains the nature of a verbal sentence
referring to it as an image [Bild] representing a state of affairs in the World:
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The world is the totality of facts, not of things./What is the case, the fact, is the
existence of atomic facts [Sachverahalten]./An atomic fact is a combination of
objects (entities, things)./That the elements of the picture [Bild] are combined
with one another in a definite way, represents that things are so combined with
one another.[…]/The representing relation consists of the coordination of the
elements of the picture [Bild] and the things./These co-ordinations are as it were
the feelers of its elements with which the picture touches reality.
(§ 1.1, § 2, § 2.01, § 2.15, § 2.1514, § 2.1515)
Here, Wittgenstein claims that what establishes human epistemic access to a fact is
the syntactic pattern given in a verbal Bild. Indeed, in a verbal sentence the structural
morpho-syntactic dependencies [co-ordinations] governing its constitutive units make
evident (and at the same time map the perception of) the pattern of connections between
objects.2 Conversely, we cannot perceive single entities of the external world as isolated
objects per se. On the contrary, the perception of external objects strictly depends on
their possibility to be perceived within a pattern of connections with other objects. In
other words, the atoms of reality are not isolated, indivisible entities, but rather cores of
connected objects: facts, which are recognized and elaborated through verbal language.
For instance, the sentence “Mary invited Paul for dinner” describes a scene whose
internal dynamic is expressed and perceived solely according to the logic underlying the
sentence itself. Notably, the exact referential value of the verb “invited” results by
connecting it to the subject effectively realizing this action, or to a possible subsequent
specification of it being, for example, an invitation to a birthday party. Indeed, as
Wittgenstein has pointed out, it is exactly these linguistic connections that, as feelers,
tap into existent states of affairs in the external world. Moreover, this overall meaning
resulting from the “syntactic” structuring of the units (both external objects and linguis-
tic elements) is to be treated as a deriving single, internally complex image (Build).
Consistent with this theoretical framework, Deacon (1997) defines humans as the
“symbolic species”. In fact, he observes that in general, nonhuman animals possess
the ability to recognize several bilateral associations between one auditory or visual
token and a correspondent external object or action (indexical connection). Human
interaction with the world differs because it is guided by the perception of the
relationships between objects through the logical relationships3 between the tokens
(Fig. 3). According to the author, this is exactly what makes human cognition unique.
Keeping with this philosophical paradigm of human language, I assume that what
differentiates the latter from other animal communication systems is the ability to
categorize the units of a pattern going beyond their isolated perceptual characteristics,
i.e. in a “symbolic” dimension. Following Deacon’s theory, I refer the term “sym-
bolic” to the uniquely human ability to combine semantic units within a network of
logical combinatorial relationships, which map into (being retroactively mapped by)
connections among external objects.
In light of these considerations, it shouldn’t be surprising that some nonhuman
species have shown the ability to recognize complex syntactic patterns: all they were
doing was applying acquired rules on a merely perceptual level of operant association
2 Here the term “object” is used in a broad sense, referring to abstract or concrete entities, as well as to
actions, subjects, etc.
3 The logical connections are those expressed both through morpho-syntactic links and logical connectors.
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between units. The ability to actively process regular patterns on a merely perceptual
level—i.e. with no semantic, nor morphological matching values involved–shown in
nonhuman animals could, indeed, be identified as a shared cognitive ability, but it is far
from the human species-typical ability to process context-free semantic structures. In
fact, only in humans these patterns have item-based interdependencies, which are linked
to connections in the external referential dimension. In human linguistic expressions the
specific feature distinguishing syntactic connections between the constitutive units of a
verbal sentence is their intrinsic possibility of a reference (e.g. an object, an action or an
emotion). This also applies to other typical human cognitive possibilities such as
computing a mathematical expression or drawing a conceptual map.
In conclusion, I hypothesize that what makes humans’ general faculty of language
species-typical is the ability to process patterns adopting cross-modal mappings. This
includes the faculty of syntaxis and of applying a referential value (relying on the
internal items’ interdependencies) as one indissoluble cognitive phenomenon. Hence,
a comparative study of language, which aims to investigate the specificity of humans’
faculty of language should, in my opinion, apply the following methodology. First, it
is necessary to address the faculty of syntaxis, conceived in the following operational
definition: the ability to associate a combinatorial pattern in a linguistic dimension to
a syntactic combination among external objects or categories of objects. Secondly,
the comparative exploration of the faculty of syntaxis has to be more specific - on the
one hand - about the specific computational strategies that could be applied to process
Fig. 3 Image modified from Deacon 1997
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a structures, and on the other hand, on the effective combinatorial value of the items
used in the given patterns. Specifically, I assume that this framework would signif-
icantly favor progress in the exploration of other animals’ ability of syntaxis if it will
focus on their capacity a) to process simple syntactic patterns with internal depen-
dencies between the elements, b) to refer these basic syntactic structures to a pattern
of external objects. These considerations could provide invaluable information on
animal combinatorial abilities, as well as on the combinatorial patterns ruling the
sentences of any natural spoken language, and other cognitive domains such as
vision, music or math. Ultimately, this could allow the understanding of what makes
a species-typical human linguistic expression out of a pattern of perceptual stimuli
and consequently, help refining the meaning of “linguistic”, when applied to the
definition of man as “zoon logikon”.
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